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Abstract We experimentally assess the ethics of the U.S.
government’s indirect bailout of the bank counterparties of
American International Group during the 2008 financial
crisis. When the indirect bailout is jointly compared with a
counterfactual where the government directly bails out the
banks, subjects judge the indirect bailout to be far more
unethical. On the other hand, when the two scenarios are
judged separately, subjects consider a direct bailout of banks
to be more unethical. This suggests that ethical judgments of
indirect versus direct action exhibit a type of preference
reversal that is dependent upon whether the evaluation mode
is joint or separate. The pedagogical and policy implications
of this preference reversal are discussed.
Keywords Behavioral ethics  Indirect agency  Bailout 
AIG  Financial crisis  Preference reversals  Framing
effects  Framing power  Joint/separate treatments
Introduction
When an organization takes an action that has the potential
to be perceived as morally questionable, does the public’s
perception of the ethics of the action depend upon whether
the action is a direct result of the organization’s own
behavior, or is instead implemented indirectly through an
agent of the organization? For example, if a multinational’s
product is produced under ‘sweatshop’ conditions abroad,
does it matter to consumers whether or not the multina-
tional owns the offending factory? Furthermore, if the
action is taken by an indirect agent, does it make a dif-
ference to outside observers as to whether the organization
could foresee the agent’s actions? These issues feed into
our understanding of the ethical judgment of individuals,
the reactions of policymakers and regulators to such
actions, and for the public relations of organizations that
are faced with ethical dilemmas. Our interest is in how
these concerns affect the perception of the U.S. govern-
ment’s indirect bailout of the bank counterparties of
American International Group (AIG) during the 2008
financial crisis and what this implies for business ethics
education.
Specifically, we consider the lingering controversy sur-
rounding the U.S. federal government’s 2008 bailout of
American International Group (AIG) from a moral per-
spective. In particular, we examine the ethics of the gov-
ernment assuming 79.9 % of shareholder equity as
compensation for providing AIG with an $85 billion two-
year loan in conjunction with the government’s decision to
have AIG pay its investment bank counterparties 100 cents
on the dollar for credit default swap agreements the banks
held with AIG’s Financial Products division. Initially, the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (hereafter, FRBNY)
prohibited AIG from releasing the terms under which it
paid the investment bank counterparties and the identities
of the counterparties themselves. When these details
became known almost four months after the fact, the
FRBNY’s actions were (i) labeled as a ‘backdoor bailout’
by the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset
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Relief Program (hereafter, SIGTARP 2009); (ii) decried in
the popular press (see Krugman 2009; Jenkins 2013; Taibbi
2013); and (iii) found to be misguided and serving no
legitimate purpose by a federal judge (Wheeler 2015).
As Boddy (2011, p. 255) observes, the global financial
crisis has raised many ethical issues concerning who pays
for the damage inflicted and who is responsible for causing
the crisis. In this paper we focus on the U.S. taxpayers,
AIG’s shareholders, and bond insurance counterparties,
and show that answering the question of who benefitted
from and paid for the AIG bailout is not straightforward
from a moral perspective. Consequently, we employ
behavioral ethics to examine the AIG bailout.1 We assess
the ethics of the government’s actions in the AIG bailout in
a laboratory setting by comparing subjects’ evaluation of
the ethics of an indirect bailout of insured bondholders with
a counterfactual where the insured bondholders are directly
bailed out under similar terms. A separate set of subjects
was asked to ethically compare both scenarios jointly and
to judge whether the government had a dubious motive for
the backdoor bailout of bondholders. We find a form of
preference reversal in that when the two scenarios are
compared jointly, subjects found the (actual) indirect
bailout to be more unethical, whereas in separate and
independent assessments subjects found the direct bailout
to be more unethical. Preference reversals of this type are
of concern because they indicate that eliciting ethical
judgments may be sensitive to the mode (joint versus
separate) in which equivalent moral issues are evaluated by
decision makers. Yet, if ethical judgment is not invariant to
the mode of evaluation, then the ability of decision makers
to consistently undertake ethical judgments may vary with
the way in which a decision is framed.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin with a
literature review of the use of the joint/separate and direct/
indirect mode of evaluation to elicit moral preferences.
This is followed by a brief history of the government’s
intervention with AIG. This sets up our description of the
behavioral experiment and associated findings. We then
focus on the pedagogical, policy, and business implications
of our findings.
Related Literature
Preference reversals occur when an individual’s prefer-
ences vary with the mode of elicitation. A simple example
is the consistent finding that subjects seek to sell an item at
a price higher than the price they would be willing to pay to
buy the same item. In this example, the mode of elicitation
varies with the role of buyer or seller. Preference reversals
are extensively studied within the social sciences because
they indicate that the basis for making judgments—a sub-
ject’s preferences—may not be stable. Within the context
of business ethics, Elm and Radin (2012) are particularly
concerned with contradictions such as ethical preference
reversals because they challenge the fundamental
assumption that ethical decision making is meaningfully
different from other decision-making processes that exhibit
similar contradictions. To this we add that ethical prefer-
ence reversals are especially troubling because they can
foster misleading practices, whereby control over the
evaluation mode facilitates a deceptive strategy for hiding
morally dubious actions.
For example, in 2005, pharmaceutical giant Merck sold
the rights to manufacture and market one of its cancer
drugs to a much smaller firm with a lower public profile,
Ovation Pharmaceutical. After the sale, Ovation raised the
price of the drug tenfold on cancer patients (Berenson
2006). In examining subjects’ perception of the ethics of
Merck’s actions, Paharia et al. (2009) allowed subjects to
morally rate the Ovation-as-intermediary price gouging
scenario versus a counterfactual where Merck directly
raised the price of the drug on cancer patients. They found
evidence of an ethical preference reversal. Specifically,
when subjects from the same population were separately
presented with either the scenario of indirectly attaining the
revenue associated with a price increase by selling the
marketing rights to another firm versus directly increasing
the price itself, subjects found the direct price increase to
be significantly more unethical. In contrast to these sepa-
rate evaluations, when subjects were presented with both
scenarios jointly, they found the indirect price increase
through the sale of marketing rights to be more unethical.
Joint evaluation makes the intent of indirect agency
transparent. Furthermore, if the indirect action is articu-
lated in terms of a dubious motive (e.g., avoiding the
negative reputation that might result from a large increase
in drug price), this increases the transparency of indirect
agency, thereby establishing causal responsibility for
unethical behavior.
Coffman (2011) experimentally tests for the formation
of a deceptive strategy that capitalizes on the difference
between joint and separate ethical judgments. In Coff-
man’s study, ethical opinions are not elicited; instead, an
outside observer is given the costless opportunity to
punish direct and indirect behavior. Coffman uses a ver-
sion of the dictator game, which is a two-player situation
in which the first mover (the dictator) determines the split
of a surplus (usually some cash amount) and the second
player (the recipient) receives the split determined by the
first mover. Prior experimental results indicate that out-
comes where the first mover takes 70 % or more of the
1 Surveys of the behavioral approach to ethics can be found in
Appiah (2008) and Bazerman and Tenbrunsel (2011).
D. G. Arce, L. Razzolini
123
surplus are regarded by others as unfair or unjust
(Camerer 2003). In Coffman’s extension, the first mover
can either directly determine the division of the surplus in
the usual way that a dictator game is played, or the first
mover can sell the right to be the dictator to an inter-
mediary. In this way, the intermediary takes on a role
akin to that of an indirect actor. Selling the right to be the
dictator obscures the first mover’s deceptive strategy to
secure an unfair payoff, as the intermediary is required to
cover the cost of becoming the dictator when determining
the division of surplus. The recipient is harmed either
directly or indirectly by the actions of the first mover.
Finally, an outside observer is given the task of specifying
whether and how the first mover is to be punished for all
possible plays of the game [e.g., the punishment is eli-
cited with a strategy method (Selten 1967)]. Coffman
finds that the degree and frequency of punishment of the
first mover significantly decreases when an intermediary
is used. Of particular concern is that it appears that first
movers understand the tempering effect of intermediaries
on punishment and so first movers frequently employ the
deceptive strategy of using intermediaries to avoid the
punishment associated with unethical behavior.
The potential, therefore, exists for the joint evaluation of
(in)direct actions within a morally charged situation to
yield different ethical judgments than separate evaluations
of the same actions. Indeed, Bazerman et al. (2011) opine
that joint evaluations of morality are less emotionally
charged than separate evaluations, and that emotions play
too strong a role in separate decision making. Joint eval-
uation prompts people to consider the primary agent’s
motives by drawing attention to the more straightforward
alternative of direct action (Paharia et al. 2009). Height-
ened awareness of the sometimes dubious motivations for
acting indirectly may, therefore, be a useful safeguard
against the abuse of power. Bazerman and Gino (2012)
contend such shifting of modes of thought can lead to
profound differences in how individuals and societies make
ethical decisions. For example, they conjecture that joint
evaluation provides the means for best understanding the
actions of those who engaged in the clearly illegal and
unethical behavior involved in the 2008 financial crisis. In
this way, behavioral ethics can be used to gauge the actions
of those who indirectly cause great harm. We test this via
an examination of the AIG intervention during the 2008
financial crisis. Indeed, in contrast to the cancer drug sce-
nario examined in Paharia et al. (2009), where one can only
make conjectures about Merck’s motivation for indirect
versus direct action, it is shown below that AIG received
explicit instructions from policymakers to hide its indirect
action. Furthermore, indirect action was taken in lieu of
direct action that was readily available to policymakers at
the time.
Background to the AIG Intervention
Founded in 1987, AIG’s Financial Products division
(hereafter, AIGFP) was originally in the business of taking
on the risk of commercial transactions (e.g., interest or
exchange rate fluctuations). Much later, AIGFP engaged in
credit default swaps (CDSs) where, for a fee, AIGFP would
agree to pay bondholders whatever portion of the under-
lying debt obligation remained in the event that the bonds
defaulted. In addition to this ‘credit risk’ of a default,
writing CDSs also exposed AIGFP to ‘collateral risk,’ in
that AIGFP would be required to post collateral with its
counterparty should AIG or the associated pool of bonds
suffer a downgrade in its credit rating.
With the advent of the subprime mortgage crisis in
2007, AIGFP was hit by numerous collateral calls by its
CDS counterparties. In 2008, through September alone, it
posted $32.8 billion in collateral to counterparties (SIG-
TARP 2009, p. 8). AIGFP was not the only bond insurer
experiencing liquidity difficulties associated with collateral
calls stemming from downgraded mortgage-backed secu-
rities. Under severe credit market conditions, it is normal
for the bank counterparty and the insurer to settle differ-
ences about bond valuations via a compromise in which the
insurer pays a discount from the face value of the contracts,
something less than 100 cents on the dollar. The amount
below 100 cents on the dollar that the counterparty receives
is known as a ‘haircut.’ The bank has to write off the
haircut as a loss.
The details of government intervention with AIG are
shown in the timeline in Fig. 1.
On September 16, 2008, the day after the Lehman
bankruptcy, the U.S. government intervened in AIG, pro-
viding it with an $85 billion dollar two-year loan at a
punitive annual interest rate of 14 percent.2 In exchange,
the government took 79.9 percent ownership of AIG.3
Given the nearly 80 % loss of shareholder equity, AIG was
effectively nationalized.
The AIG intervention was the most money ever
expended by the U.S. government to save a private com-
pany. But was saving AIG the actual purpose of the
intervention? A report of the Office of the Special Inspector
General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP
2009) unequivocally labeled the AIG intervention as a
‘‘backdoor bailout’’ of AIGFP’s bank counterparties to the
CDSs (Barofsky 2012, p. 187). In fact, the government
eventually used $62 billion to pay off AIGFP’s entire CDS
2 The interest rate was later lowered and the full amount of the loans
to AIG would subsequently total $182 billion.
3 The government’s stake was deliberately kept below 80 % because
by law at 80 % ownership or above, FRBNY would have had to
consolidate AIG’s financials within FRBNY’s balance sheet.
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obligations at 100 cents on the dollar (i.e., no haircuts) by
having AIG make up the difference between the collateral
already given to the counterparties and the par value of the
CDSs (see Table 1). The structured investment vehicle
(SIV) used to make the payments was called Maiden Lane
III. Moreover, the FRBNY prohibited AIG from reporting
the identities of the bank counterparties and the amounts of
payments made to each of them. It was only after Con-
gressional insistence that the names and amounts were
finally released, approximately four months after the pay-
ments were made.
The consensus is that most of the CDSs insured by
AIGFP had a market value of less than 50 cents on the
dollar (Boyd 2011, p. 293) and AIG had already provided a
significant amount of collateral to its bank counterparties.
When pressed by Congress as to why payment was made at
full value, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner—who was
the President of the FRBNY at the time—stated that, ‘‘the
financial condition of the counterparties was not a relevant
factor’’ [in the decision to bail out AIG] (SIGTARP 2009,
p. 15). By contrast, in his memoire, Stress Test, Geithner
(2014, pp. 215, 219, 246, 409) called the payment of AIG’s
counterparties at 100 cents on the dollar a ‘‘no brainer’’ and
part of what was to become a ‘no-haircuts-in-a-panic
doctrine.’ The rationale was that haircuts would send a
destabilizing signal that more haircuts were coming,
encouraging a run on financial firms, thereby acting as a
panic accelerant for the financial system as a whole.4
The loss in shareholder equity and subsequent payments
to the counterparties formed the basis for a lawsuit filed by
Starr International (2013), a charity that was one of the
largest shareholders of AIG.5 Starr is run by former AIG
CEO Maurice ‘‘Hank’’ Greenberg. Presiding Judge Thomas
C. Wheeler (2015, p. 6) noted that, ‘‘since most of the other
financial institutions experiencing a liquidity crisis were
counterparties to AIG transactions, the Government was
able to minimize the ripple effect of an AIG failure by
using AIG’s assets to make sure the counterparties were
paid in full on these transactions.’’ In his ruling, Judge
Wheeler wrote (p. 7), ‘‘The Government’s unduly harsh
treatment of AIG in comparison to other institutions
seemingly was misguided and had no legitimate purpose,
even considering concerns about ‘moral hazard.’ Having
considered the entire record, the Court finds in Starr’s favor
on the illegal exaction claim.’’ At the same time, Judge
Wheeler awarded no damages to Starr, concluding that
AIG’s shareholders’ benefit was to avoid bankruptcy, and
to ‘‘live to fight another day.’’
The SIGTARP characterization of the AIG ‘backdoor
bailout,’ various media reports (e.g., Krugman 2009;
Jenkins 2013; Taibbi 2013), and the judge’s subsequent
ruling on the Starr International lawsuit all raise the ethical
issues of why did the government choose to (a) make
Events Prior to the Intervention
July 28, 2008 Aug 4, 2008 August 2008 Sept 15, 2008
Bond insurer SCA settles 
with Merrill Lynch at 30¢ 
on the dollar.
Bond insurer Ambac 
settles with Citigroup at 
60¢ on the dollar.
Goldman Sachs approaches AIG 
about a settlement involving a 
haircut.
Lehman files for bankruptcy. 
Intervention Period
Sept 16, 2008 Sept 25, 2008 Oct 14, 2008 Nov 10, 2008
Initial $85b AIG 
intervention by FRBNY.
AIG shareholders lose 
79.9% equity. The 
government-owned firm 
continues to make collateral 
payments to counterparties.
$2b FDIC sale of 
Washington Mutual to 
JP Morgan Chase.
Bondholders receive 25¢ 
on the dollar. 
AIG counterparties are among nine 
banks that receive direct capital 
injections from the Treasury through 
TARP. Bank of America ($15b), 
Goldman Sachs ($10b), Merrill 
Lynch ($10b), Wells Fargo ($25b). 
FRBNY intervention in AIG is 
restructured in coordination with the 
Treasury. AIG’s counterparties paid 
100¢ on the dollar (no haircut) by 
Maiden Lane III SIV on Nov 25. 
Aftermath
Feb 27, 2009 Mar 5, 2009 Mar 15, 2009 Nov 17, 2009
$99b Citigroup bailout.
Shareholders lose 30% 
equity. 
Federal Reserve Vice 
Chairman testifies before 
Congress about AIG 
counterparty payments but 
refuses to identify 
counterparties or terms.
After significant public and 
Congressional pressure, AIG 
counterparties are identified and 
effective payments of 100¢ on the 
dollar are revealed.
SIGTARP report characterizes AIG 
intervention as a ‘backdoor bailout’ 
of AIG’s bank counterparties.
Fig. 1 AIG Intervention Timeline
4 On the issue of the absence of a haircut, it is well known that UBS
volunteered to take a two percent haircut if all other counterparties
did the same, but was told by FRBNY officials that this was not
necessary (SIGTARP 2009, p. 15). Less well-known is Goldman
Sachs’ willingness to take a haircut prior to the intervention. A
Footnote 4 continued
subsequent BlackRock report found that Goldman approached AIG a
month before the intervention about taking a haircut (Chittum 2010).
Perhaps this was because Goldman was so completely hedged against
AIG’s collateral risk that it would have received slightly more had
AIG instead actually defaulted on its obligations (SIGTARP 2009,
p. 16).
5 Note that AIG itself decided not to join this lawsuit.
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AIGFP’s counterparties whole at 100 cents on the dollar,
(b) do so indirectly via AIG rather than directly, and
(c) destroy AIG shareholder equity by this indirect means?
Moreover, a direct counterfactual exists to the govern-
ment’s indirect bailout of counterparties via its intervention
in AIG. Specifically, the government could have bailed out
AIGPF’s counterparties directly, thereby ending the col-
lateral calls that were siphoning off AIG’s reserves. After
all, AIG’s domestic bank counterparties also received
capital injections directly from the government through
TARP (see Table 1), and the Fed eventually purchased
mortgage-backed securities directly from banks through its
quantitative easing program. Given the existence of this
direct bailout alternative, in what follows we use the direct/
indirect and joint/separate methodology to assess the ethics
of the government during the AIG intervention.
Experiments
We conducted two experiments to examine the ethics of the
government’s AIG intervention during the 2008 financial
crisis. We used a joint/separate evaluation design to assess
subjects’ ethical evaluation of the government’s actual
indirect (backdoor) bailout of investment banks through a
large bond insurance firm versus a counterfactual where the
government directly bails out investment banks. In either
scenario, the government imposes hardship on the share-
holders of the bond insurer’s parent company who, as a
consequence, lose a percentage of their ownership stake in
the parent company as compensation to the government for
the bailout.
In the first experiment, we evaluated the effect of indi-
rect agency while keeping the magnitude of harmful con-
sequences on shareholders constant, by testing whether
(1) when evaluating the facts separately, individuals
judge the indirect bailout of investment banks
through a large bond insurer more leniently than a
direct bailout of the investment banks;
(2) when evaluating the facts jointly, the direct versus
indirect effect is eliminated and the indirect bailout
of investment banks through the bond insurer is
considered more unethical.
In the second experiment, we evaluated the effect of
indirect agency and changed the magnitude of harmful
consequences on shareholders in the direct versus indirect
case.
In both experiments, subjects in the separate treatments
were presented with either a description of a direct or
indirect intervention and were asked to rate the ethics of
the government’s actions on a ten-point scale ranging from
1 (the government’s behavior was not at all unethical) to 10
(the government’s behavior was very unethical). This rat-
ing scale is shown in Fig. 2. Differences between the two
treatments were then tested statistically by comparing the
1–10 ratings of the indirect bailout with the 1–10 ratings of
the direct bailout. In the joint treatment, subjects were
Table 1 Total Payments to AIG Credit Default Swap (CDS) Counterparties (in $U.S. billions)
AIG counterparty Maiden lane III payment Prior collateral payments posted Total
Socie´te´ Ge´ne´rale 6.9 9.6 16.5
Goldman Sachs* 5.6 8.4 14.0
Merrill Lynch* 3.1 3.1 6.2
Deutsche Bank 2.8 5.7 8.5
UBS 2.5 1.3 3.8
Calyon 1.2 3.1 4.3
Deutsche Zentral-Genossenschaftsbank 1.0 0.8 1.8
Bank of Montreal 0.9 0.5 1.4
Wachovia* 0.8 0.2 1.0
Barclays 0.6 0.9 1.5
Bank of America* 0.5 0.3 0.8
The Royal Bank of Scotland 0.5 0.6 1.1
Dresdner Bank AG 0.4 0.0 0.4
Rabobank 0.3 0.3 0.6
Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg 0.1 0.0 0.1
HSBC Bank, USA 0.0 0.2 0.2
Total 27.1 35.0 62.1
* Also received TARP funds in the interim between the initial AIG intervention and Maiden Lane III
Source SIGTARP (2009, p. 20)
The Indirect Ethics of AIG’s ‘Backdoor Bailout’
123
instead asked to simultaneously compare the indirect
bailout with the direct counterfactual. A bipolar scale, also
shown in Fig. 2, was used for the joint treatment, with one
unit rating increments from -5 to 0 to 5. This scale is used
because subjects themselves were asked to directly make
the comparison, whereas in the separate treatment the
comparison is made by statistical means. In the joint rating,
negative scores indicated that subjects found the direct
bailout to be more unethical, with a score of -5 corre-
sponding to the direct bailout being ethically much worse
that the indirect one. A score of 0 corresponds to the rating
that the two cases are equally ethical/unethical. Positive
scores reflected a rating that the indirect bailout was more
unethical, with a score of 5 indicating that the indirect
bailout is ethically much worse than the direct one. Hence,
a statistically positive score indicates that in the joint
comparison the indirect bailout is rated to be more uneth-
ical than the direct bailout (a one-sample t test was used
with 0—the scale midpoint—as test value).
The experiment headings below are denoted by two
numbers, the first being the shareholders’ loss of equity in the
direct intervention (the counterfactual) and the second
number corresponding to the (actual) shareholder loss of
equity in the indirect intervention. A total of 541 subjects
participated in the experiment, 225 in the 80–80 treatment
and 316 in the 50–80 treatment. Student participants were
asked to complete the survey in exchange for extra points
toward their class grade. Experiments were conducted at
Virginia Commonwealth University, with students recruited
mostly from upper level business and economics courses.
After completing the survey, students answered a
questionnaire about their personal characteristics. The sub-
jects’ sample was about 60 percent male. As is quite com-
mon in behavioral studies of ethics (e.g., Bateman et al.
2002; O’Fallon and Butterfield 2005), we found no statisti-
cally significant differences for our findings when the sample
was subdivided according to gender. For this reason, the
results below are presented for the sample as a whole. The
sample mean age was 21.56 (with a standard deviation of
4.0). The subjects’ sample was diverse and close to the U.S.
population composition, as 52 % of the subjects identified
themselves as White, 18 percent Afro-American, about
13 % as Asian, and 6 percent Hispanic with the remainder
being either multiracial or giving no response.6
Experiment 80–80
Procedure
225 individuals (79 females, 146 male, Mean age = 22.57,




B0: Separate evaluation—indirect ? foreknowledge
AB: Joint evaluation
AB0: Joint evaluation
Fig. 2 Rating Scales
6 When asked about their religiosity, 55 % of the subjects reported
attending religious services once a month or more.
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When facing scenario A or B separately or both sce-
narios jointly, participants read the following background
information:
Investment banks keep bonds on their books that are
risky, but can be extremely profitable. The invest-
ment banks design and create these bonds them-
selves. Because investment banks cannot be insured
by the government, they purchase insurance on their
assets from private bond insurance firms. Many of the
shareholders of the parent companies of these bond
insurance firms do not have a good understanding of
the type of bonds their firms insure, owing to the
bonds’ complexity and that bond insurance is not
regarded as the primary business activity of the par-
ent company.
When the bonds of several investment banks go bad
at the same time, it is unlikely that a bond insurance
firm can reimburse all of the investment banks at the
insured value (100 cents on the dollar). Recently a
bond insurance firm (Company X, in the Table be-
low) and an investment bank entered into negotia-
tions because $45 billion of the bank’s bonds had
gone bad. These negotiations resulted in the insur-
ance firm paying the investment bank 14 cents on the
dollar for bonds that were originally insured for the
total value of $45 billion. As a result of this, share-
holders of the bond insurer’s parent company X lost
approximately 50 % of the value of their ownership
stake in the insurer’s parent company. This privately
negotiated resolution and two others like it, for parent









investment banks from the
bond insurer
X $45 billion 14 cents on the dollar
Y $3.5 billion 29 cents on the dollar
Z $1.4 billion 60 cents on the dollar
Two months later a much larger bond insurance
firm, Firm W, is having trouble covering its $63
billion in insurance obligations to investment banks.
The government decides to pay $63 billion to bail
out the investment banks, rather than Firm W, the
bond insurer. That is, the government pays the
investment banks 100 cents on the dollar for the
$63 billion in bonds that were insured by Firm W.
As a result of this, shareholders lost 80 % of the
value of their ownership stake in bond insurer firm
W’s parent company as compensation to the
government.
When facing scenario B, on the other hand, participants
read (the text in italics was replaced with the following
text):
The government decides to pay $63 billion to bail out
the large bond insurer, Firm W, and then instructs
Firm W to conduct a back-door bailout of the
investment banks, in which Firm W pays the invest-
ment banks 100 cents on the dollar for the $63 billion
insured. As a result of this, shareholders lost 80 % of
the value of their ownership stake in bond insurer
firm W’s parent company as compensation to the
government.
When facing scenario B0, which casts the government’s
action through a dubious motive, participants read (the text
in italics was replaced with the following text):
The government decides to pay $63 billion to bail out
the large bond insurer, Firm W, and then instructs
Firm W to conduct a back-door bailout of the
investment banks, in which Firm W pays the invest-
ment banks 100 cents on the dollar for the $63 billion
insured. As a result of this, shareholders lost 80 % of
the value of their ownership stake in bond insurer
firm W’s parent company as compensation to the
government. One possible motive for the government
using taxpayer money to bail out Firm W and having
it pay 100 cents on the dollar to the investment banks
is that the government is worried by the negative
press that a bailout of the investment banks would
cause.
All participants were asked ‘‘On a scale of 1 (not at all
unethical) to 10 (very unethical), how unethical do you
think the government’s behavior was in this decision?’’
In scenario AB (AB0), the text in italics was replaced by
the following:
Consider the following two cases:
A. The government decides to pay $63 billion to
bail out the investment banks, rather than
Firm W, the bond insurer. That is, the
government pays the investment banks 100
cents on the dollar for the $63 billion in bonds
that were insured by Firm W. As a result of
this, shareholders lost 80 % of the value of
their ownership stake in bond insurer firm
W’s parent company as compensation to the
government.
B. The government decides to pay $63 billion to
bail out the large bond insurer, Firm W, and
then instructs Firm W to conduct a backdoor
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bailout of the investment banks, in which
Firm W pays the investment banks 100 cents
on the dollar for the $63 billion insured. As a
result of this, shareholders lost 80 % of the
value of their ownership stake in bond insurer
firm W’s parent company as compensation to
the government.
B0. The government decides to pay $63 billion to
bail out the large bond insurer, Firm W, and
then instructs Firm W to conduct a backdoor
bailout of the investment banks, in which
Firm W pays the investment banks 100 cents
on the dollar for the $63 billion insured. As a
result of this, shareholders lost 80 % of the
value of their ownership stake in bond insurer
firm W’s parent company as compensation to
the government. One possible motive for the
government using taxpayer money to bail out
Firm W and having it pay 100 cents on the
dollar to the investment banks is that the
government is worried by the negative press
that a bailout of the investment banks would
cause.
In scenarios AB and AB0, participants were asked ‘‘In
which case would the behavior of the government have
been more unethical?’’ Possible ratings ranged from -5
‘‘In terms of ethics, Case A is much worse than Case B
(B0)’’ to 0 ‘‘In terms of ethics, the two cases are equally
ethical/unethical,’’ to ?5 ‘‘In terms of ethics, Case B (B0) is
much worse than Case A.’’
Notice that in this experiment, the magnitude of harm
(80 % of ownership value) does not change in the cases A
versus B (B0). Only the direct versus indirect action by the
government is different in the two scenarios. The statistics
for each treatment are given in Table 2 and the associated
results are presented and discussed below.
Results
When judging separately case A and B, the results from the
survey reveal a significant effect of directness, as
t(84) = 2.89, p\ 0.05, indicating that the direct bailout in
case A was rated as significantly more unethical (M = 6.8,
SD = 2.24) than the indirect bailout in case B (M = 5.31,
SD = 2.53). This holds even though the government’s
actions in case B are labeled as a ‘‘backdoor bailout.’’ By
contrast, the results from the survey do not support a sig-
nificant effect of directness when combined with fore-
knowledge (A and B0), as t(88) = 1.09, p = 0.27,
indicating that case A was not rated as more unethical than
case B0. Foreknowledge of a dubious motive reduces the
effect of indirect agency.
The results for the joint evaluation of A and B were
analyzed with a one-sample t test using the midpoint of the
scale (zero) as the test value. The results—t(46) = 2.75,
p\ 0.01—indicated that indirect bailout scenario B was
rated as significantly more unethical (M = 1.0, SD = 2.49)
than direct bailout scenario A, when the two scenarios were
judged together. Using the same test for A and B’, the
results—t(45) = 4.38, p\ 0.0001—indicated that the
indirect foreknowledge scenario B0 was rated as extremely
significantly more unethical (M = 1.35, SD = 2.09) than
the direct case A, when the two scenarios were judged
together.
Discussion
When the scenarios were evaluated separately, participants
considered the government’s direct bailout of the invest-
ment banks more unethical than the indirect bailout
through bond insurer firm W. This means that participants
were more lenient when separately judging harm caused by
an indirect action. On the other hand, when the scenarios
Table 2 Results for the 80–80 Treatment 80 % loss of shareholder equity in the direct treatment 80 % loss of shareholder equity in the indirect
treatment
Conditions









Direct bailout versus indirect
bailout dubious motive
Mean 6.80 5.31 6.30 1.00 1.35
Standard deviation 2.24 2.53 2.10 2.49 2.09
Observations (N = 225) 44 42 46 47 46
Evaluations
Separate A vs. B A rated as significantly more unethical than B, t(84) = 2.89, p\ 0.05
Separate A vs. B0 A not rated as significantly more unethical than B0, t(88) = 1.09, p = 0.27
Joint AB B rated as significantly more unethical than A, t(46) = 2.75, p\ 0.01
Joint AB0 B0 rated as extremely significantly more unethical than A, t(45) = 4.38, p\ 0.0001
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were evaluated jointly, a reversal of judgment was
observed; implying that the unethical nature of an indirect
action becomes more transparent. Notice that when adding
the foreknowledge of a dubious motive, the difference in
separate judgments of directness and indirectness disap-
pears, as the participants did not distinguish between a
direct bailout of investment banks and an indirect bailout
with foreknowledge of a dubious motive. This fact is
reinforced by the result that when judged together, scenario
B0 is considered extremely more unethical than A.
Experiment 50–80
In this experiment, the two cases A and B (B0) differ in two
ways, whereas previously the difference was only in terms
of direct versus indirect action (and foreknowledge of a
dubious motive for the B0 case). Now the magnitude of
harm changes to a 50 % loss of ownership value in the
direct case, A, but remains 80 % in the indirect case, B and
B0. The 50 % loss in equity is closer to the 30 % loss that
shareholders experienced in the Citigroup bailout. In the
previous 80–80 experiment, we kept the magnitude of harm
on shareholders constant at 80 % and examined only the
effect of changing the indirectness of the government
action. From a policy perspective, it would be useful to
know if moral sentiment about the bailout would change if
the consequences for shareholders had been more in line
with other bailouts.
Procedure
316 individuals (133 females, 183 male, Mean
age = 21.23 SD = 2.09) were randomly assigned to one of
five different conditions:
A: Separate evaluation—direct ? 50 % loss of share-
holder equity
B: Separate evaluation—indirect ? 80 % loss of share-
holder equity
B0: Separate evaluation—indirect ? foreknowl-
edge ? 80 % loss of shareholder equity
AB: Joint evaluation
AB0: Joint evaluation
Subjects in the separate treatments A versus B (and A
vs. B0) were presented with the same ten-point scale as in
the 80–80 experiment, and those in the joint treatment (AB
or AB0) were again presented with the bipolar -5 to 0 to 5
scale (see Fig. 2). The statistics corresponding to these
comparisons are given in Table 3.
Results
In the separate evaluation of A and B, when the loss in
shareholder equity is reduced from 80 to 50 % for the
direct bailout, the results from the survey do not support a
significant effect of directness, as t(131) = 0.39, p = 0.69,
indicating that case A was not rated as more unethical than
case B. Similarly, the results from the survey do not sup-
port a significant effect of directness when combined with
foreknowledge (A and B0), as t(125) = 0.30, p = 0.76,
indicating that case A was not rated as more unethical than
case B0. Once again, foreknowledge of a dubious motive
reduces the effect of indirect agency.
Given a 50 % loss in shareholder equity for case A, the
results now indicate that the indirect scenario B was rated
as extremely significantly more unethical (M = 2.08,
SD = 2.49) than case A, when the two scenarios were
judged jointly—t(61) = 6.57, p\ 0.0001. The results
were again analyzed with a one-sample t test using the
Table 3 Results for the 50–80 treatment 50 % loss of shareholder equity in the direct treatment 80 % loss of shareholder equity in the indirect
treatment
Conditions










indirect bailout dubious motive
Mean 5.97 5.81 5.85 2.08 2.48
Standard deviation 2.31 2.39 2.15 2.49 1.79
Observations (N = 316) 66 67 61 62 60
Evaluations
Separate A vs. B A not rated as significantly more unethical than B, t(131) = 0.39, p = 0.69
Separate A vs. B0 A not rated as significantly more unethical than case B0, t(125) = 0.30, p = 0.76
Joint AB B rated as extremely significantly more unethical than case A, t(61) = 6.57, p\ 0.0001
Joint AB0 B0 rated as extremely significantly more unethical than case A, t(59) = 10.73, p\ 0.0001
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midpoint of the scale (zero) as the test value. Moreover,
indirect scenario B0 was rated as extremely significantly
more unethical (M = 2.48, SD = 1.79) than case A—
t(59) = 10.73, p\ 0.0001—when the two scenarios were
judged together.
Discussion
When separately evaluating the direct versus indirect
bailout of banks through bond insurer firm W under greater
harm in the indirect case (80 %) as compared to the direct
case (50 %), participants were not able to distinguish the
two in terms of ethicality. The increase in harm done to
shareholders in the indirect case appears to offset the lesser
harm done to shareholders in the direct case. On the other
hand, when the two scenarios were evaluated together, a
clear judgment was observed, as scenarios B and B0 are
considered extremely more unethical than A, implying that
the indirectness of the bailout is judged as less important
than the magnitude of its harmful consequences.
Implications7
In both experimental treatments, subjects were told that the
scenario they just evaluated was based on a real-world
event. During the survey, subjects were also asked to state
whether they had any knowledge of what real-world event
that was. Even though the word bailout was used in the
description of the scenario, only 4.25 % of the subjects
correctly identified AIG as the real-world event. The
majority were only able to generally connect the scenario
to the 2008 financial crisis and the government interven-
tions in the banking and/or financial system. Thus, the
ethical preference reversal observed in the experiment
cannot be attributed to prior knowledge by the subjects
about the AIG bailout.
The AIG intervention explored here provides valuable
lessons as to how unethical conduct results from cognitive
restructuring. Bandura (2002) contends that moral agency
has dual aspects: inhibitive—the power to refrain from
behaving unethically, and proactive—the power to behave
ethically. The mechanisms that prevent either of these
include the cognitive restructuring of unethical conduct
into a benign or worthy one by: moral justification, sani-
tizing language and exonerative social comparison, dis-
avowal of personal agency in the harm one causes by
diffusion or displacement of responsibility, disregarding or
minimizing the injurious effects of one’s actions, and
attribution of blame to, and dehumanization of, those who
are victimized. Safeguards must be put into place that
uphold ethical behavior and renounce unethical behavior.
In the AIG intervention, sanitizing language and
euphemistic labeling were widely used. For example, in
order to limit taxpayers’ ire, Secretary of the Treasury
Hank Paulson (2010, pp. 233, 237, 240) asked all con-
cerned to characterize the Fed’s actions toward AIG as
rescues or interventions, but not bailouts. In addition,
exonerating comparisons are often used to elicit approval
of morally questionable actions. As Fed Chairman Ben
Bernanke testified before Congress, ‘‘I share your concern.
I share your anger. It’s a terrible situation….But we’re not
doing this to bail out AIG or their shareholders, certainly.
We’re doing this to protect our financial system and to
avoid a much more severe crisis in our global economy.’’
Finally, disregarding or minimizing the injurious effects of
one’s actions and the attribution of blame to those who are
victimized also occurred. ‘‘There are a lot of things that
have happened in the last eighteen months, but what has
happened at AIG is the most outrageous …. No one cares
about the shareholders of AIG. No one feels the slightest
obligation to people who led us into these difficulties’’
(Obama administration economic advisor Larry Summers
in Suskind (2011, p. 216).
Our results on direct versus indirect and joint versus
separate moral evaluations of the AIG bailout also fall
within the domain of the moral emergencies that are pop-
ular dilemmas in ethics classrooms (Appiah 2008), as
exemplified by ‘trolley’ or ‘footbridge’ problems. In these
exotic moral dilemmas, ethical judgment is influenced by
perceived moral differences between harmful omission
versus harmful action, even though the ultimate result is
the same (Lapsley and Hill 2008). Appiah (2008,
pp. 96–97) identifies moral emergencies as having the
following four features: they involve (i) limited (i.e.,
instantaneous) decision time that disallows the opportunity
to gather more information; (ii) a clear and simple set of
options; (iii) high stakes that narrow the ranges of options
to consider; and (iv) optimum placement in that the deci-
sion maker bears responsibility because no one else is in
better position or more equipped to act. By pointing out
these features, Appiah casts doubt as to whether much is
learned from such highly unlikely and idiosyncratic trolley
or footbridge problems, because they require the assump-
tion that what is learned from imaginary scenarios mirror
our responses to real ones.
By contrast, the AIG intervention is not a theoretical
construct. It was instead a real-world phenomenon and the
actions of the participants involved have subsequently been
evaluated by a federal judge. The AIG bailout satisfies
Appiah’s four features of a moral emergency. First,
heightened sensitivities to adverse market reactions
immediately following the ‘Lehman weekend’ meant that
7 We thank an anonymous reviewer for helping us to flesh out this
section.
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government officials needed to act almost instantaneously
to address AIG’s situation, because it was felt that without
an intervention AIG may not last out the week (Paulson
2010, p. 217). Second, the option considered was clearly
identified by a similarly structured but failed attempt at a
private resolution of AIG’s collateral crisis during the same
weekend by Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase that the
government then adopted and augmented with an addi-
tional $10 billion in funding (Barofsky 2012; Bernanke
2015). Third, the stakes were extremely high for both AIG,
its counterparties, and perhaps the world economy, given
AIG’s role in greasing the wheels of world commerce via
its non-AIGFP businesses involved in retirement savings
and pension funds, transoceanic shipping insurance, airline
insurance and aircraft leasing, employee healthcare/bene-
fits, etc. Finally, by their own assertion, the intervention in
AIG by Treasury and Fed officials satisfies the condition of
optimal placement, because private attempts at rescuing
AIG had failed. No other entities could possibly act in
rescuing AIG.
Within the context of teaching business ethics, Elm and
Radin (2012) argue that when ethical decision making
exhibits contradictions—such as the preference reversals
identified in this study—there may be no distinction
between ethical and other types of decision-making pro-
cesses. Elm and Radin (p. 325) further contend that this
means that the field of ethical decision making as it exists
among the social sciences may be impoverished by not
being connected to research on decision making in general.
We add that if this is the case, then it suggests that ethical
decision making should be regularized within the social
sciences and its extension to business. If ethical decision
making is not all that different, then it should not be held
apart and the ethical content of a decision should be con-
sidered as regularly as the accounting, economic, strategic,
etc., dimensions of a business decision. Ethics is no more
separatable from business decision making than are the
aforementioned functional areas of business. Our study
supports Elm and Radin’s thesis via the identification and
consideration of three decision-making contradictions
within an ethical context: preference reversals, framing
effects, and dual processing. We briefly discuss each in
turn.
First, ethical preference reversals raise the issue of the
extent to which ethical judgment takes place with respect
to subjects’ preexisting moral constructs, or if instead
moral criteria are constructed within the context of eliciting
ethical judgment. That is, preference reversals suggest that
subjects’ moral reasoning may be unstable, depending
upon intuitions that vary with the mode of evaluation.
Moreover, moral judgments can only be made in separate
or joint evaluation mode. If ethical judgments are not
stable across these modes, then either decision makers
apply different ethical principles in the separate and joint
treatments, or they are unable to apply the same principle
uniformly over the treatments. Ethical preference reversals,
therefore, raise the uncomfortable reality that what is
considered ethical may depend upon how a particular
decision is presented. In other words, those who have the
power to design how an ethical dilemma is approached
may be able, in a very real way, to dictate what is viewed
as ethical and what is not (Table 4).
Indeed, Dedeke (2015, p. 438) suggests that the framing
of a moral issue by the decision maker deserves perhaps
even more attention than moral awareness does, as the first
stage of moral decision making, because moral decision
making is influenced by how issues are framed. Dedeke,
therefore, recommends that ethics training include exam-
ples of how different framing of issues lead to different
outcomes. The sensitivity of direct versus indirect moral
judgments to whether they are framed jointly or separately
is such an example. As our study shows, framing can
introduce an uncomfortable degree of relativism into the
question of what is ethical or unethical. It also implies that
meta-processes can be consciously manipulated in order to
make a decision appear more ethical or more moral. Hence,
while framing is a traditional subject in judgment and
decision theory (e.g., Baron 2008), our results suggest that
cases such as the AIG bailout are needed within business
ethics courses so that the effects of framing are understood
within an ethical context. Only then, as Dedeke suggests,
can close attention be paid to the contribution of framing
when unethical decisions occur. Business ethics education
that includes the effects of framing can, therefore, lead
employees to challenge framing practices.
Finally, this leads us to the application of dual pro-
cessing to moral decision making. Following the termi-
nology of Stanovich and West (2000), dual processing is
characterized by System 1 and System 2 methods of rea-
soning. System 1 processing is embodied by associative,
experiential, implicit, and tacit heuristics. By contrast,
System 2 processing is analytical, conscious, deliberative,
and ‘rational.’ In particular, a decision maker may use
System 2 processing to override System 1 decisions via
judgment upon reflection (Lapsley and Hill 2008). In our
study, the limited information presented in the separate
framework lends itself to System 1 processing, while the
joint framework permits System 2 processing. Our results,
therefore, illustrate the ability of System 2 processing to
monitor System 1 judgments, as well as the limitations of
moral heuristics in the absence of considering counterfac-
tuals, whether or not they are explicitly provided. Provis
(2015) calls this ‘‘hypothetical thinking.’’ System 2 pro-
cessing facilitates connecting the dots, but it does so at a
tradeoff of requiring much more cognitive effort than
System 1 processing does. Including separate versus joint
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and direct versus indirect examples within business ethics
education allows hypothetical reasoning to become more
automatic, thereby reducing the associated cognitive effort.
Conclusion
Charles Ferguson, the 2011 Oscar-winning director of the
financial crisis documentary, Inside Job, lamented during
his acceptance speech that, ‘‘not a single financial execu-
tive has gone to jail’’ in relation to behavior that led to the
financial crisis.8 Ben Bernanke has similarly concluded that
there should have been more accountability at the indi-
vidual level because, ‘‘everything that went wrong or was
illegal was done by some individual, not by an abstract
firm’’ (Page 2015).9 Yet, the statute of limitations ran out
long ago for dubious financial practices undertaken prior to
the crisis. However, no statute of limitations exists for
judging the ethics of actions committed during the financial
crisis. It is also well accepted among business ethicists that
judgment pertaining to the legality of an action can be
separate from judgment about the action’s morality. Given
that the new millennium has already experienced two crises
related to dubious business practices, the need to under-
stand how business and government decision makers form
ethical judgments to preclude such crises is greater than
ever.
We use the direct/indirect and joint/separate evaluation
mode to examine one of the most controversial decisions
made by the U.S. government during the financial crisis;
namely, the decision to bail out American International
Group (AIG) in the fall of 2008. This action, taken col-
lectively by the U.S. Department of Treasury, the Federal
Reserve, and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, was
controversial for at least three reasons. First, it was the
largest government bailout of a public corporation, even-
tually totaling some $182 billion. Second, shareholders lost
79.9 percent of their ownership stake in AIG as compen-
sation for the intervention. Indeed, a large AIG share-
holder, the Starr International charity, sued the U.S.
government over these terms, and a federal judge found
that the exaction of shareholder equity was illegal (Wheeler
2015). Third, the newly government-controlled AIG paid
off bank counterparties at 100 cents on the dollar for
Table 4 Summary of implications for pedagogy





Ethical judgment is influenced by perceived moral
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harmful action, even though the ultimate result is
the same
Such ‘trolley’ or ‘footbridge’ problems are highly
unlikely and idiosyncratic whereas the AIG
intervention satisfies Appiah’s (2008) four features
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implicit, and heuristic. System 2 processing:
analytical, conscious, deliberative, and ‘rational.’
Examine the limitations of moral heuristics in the









8 By contrast, Arce (2013) documents that those convicted during the
savings and loan crisis of the 1980 s-1990 s and the dot.com and ‘new
economy’ crises at the turn of the millennium often received
sentences that were far longer than the average sentence for murder
in the U.S.
9 Friedman and McNeil (2013, p. 108) argue that the fines that
regulators later placed on large financial institutions are morally
questionable because they penalize shareholders without punishing
those employees directly responsible for the dubious practices.
Moreover, shareholders often suffered from the effects of those
dubious practices in the first place.
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collateralized debt swaps (bond insurance) that the banks
held with AIG’s Financial Products division (AIGFP) and
had a market value of less than 50 cents on the dollar. This
final action was characterized as a ‘backdoor bailout’ of the
bank counterparties by the Office of the Special Investi-
gator General of the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(SIGTARP 2009) and as misguided and serving no legiti-
mate purpose by the judge in the Starr lawsuit (Wheeler
2015) .
Our results show that when the indirect bailout of banks
is jointly compared with a counterfactual where the gov-
ernment directly bails out banks, subjects judge the indirect
bailout to be far more unethical. Joint evaluations can
establish causal responsibility for indirect unethical
behavior. Moreover, Coffman (2011) shows that those
responsible for an unethical action understand that they can
avoid being associated with unethical behavior by
employing a deceptive strategy that designates the action to
an intermediary. Unless outside observers have the benefit
of being presented with the possibility of direct action, it is
difficult to trace the indirect action back to the party ulti-
mately responsible for the questionable behavior. It appears
that the government officials involved with the decision to
pay 100 cents on the dollar to AIG’s counterparties
understood this when they prohibited AIG from revealing
the extent of the payments made to the counterparties or
even to identify the counterparties. By contrast, our study
suggests that government officials may have been better
served by transparently bailing out AIG’s counterparties
directly, if this was their ultimate concern, as has been
claimed by SIGTARP, and to do so at terms more in line
with other bailouts; e.g., the $99 billion bailout of Citi-
group in which shareholders lost 30 % of their equity or the
FDIC’s insistence that Washington Mutual’s bondholders
receive 25 cents on the dollar. Indeed, the government
eventually did buy distressed mortgage-backed securities
directly from banks through its quantitative easing pro-
gram. In the end, the government ultimately made $22
billion on the AIG bailout (Paletta and Scism 2014), so it
could certainly have afforded to make less by taking a
lower share of AIG.10
Most importantly, what we find is that ethical judgments
are not consistent or stable, and can, therefore, be manip-
ulated by those with the power to frame ethical dilemmas.
This is what our analysis of the AIG bailout illustrates and
what our experiments corroborate. Moral decision making
can exhibit inconsistencies that are commonly associated
with decision making in the social sciences. Specifically,
moral decision makers can exhibit preference reversals,
framing effects, and dual decision processes.
Demonstrating that moral decision making and decision
making in the business arena or social sciences can exhibit
similar inconsistencies is one thing. The societal implica-
tions of such inconsistences, however, define an entirely
different issue. Individuals that seek a higher price when
acting as sellers as compared to the price sought when
acting as buyers are not violating the tenet of ‘‘conforming
to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law
and those embodied in ethical custom’’ (Friedman 1970,
p. 33). On the other hand, seeking a higher price for cancer
drugs or bond counterparties via purposeful indirect action
adversely affects the health of patients and violates share-
holders’ rights, respectively. Capitalizing on one’s ability
to undertake morally dubious behavior by hiding it via
indirect action is an attempt to violate social mores without
incurring the consequences. It is, therefore, imperative that
the effects of such strategies be addressed within the
business ethics classroom, so that role of power in framing
issues can be discussed and students can become practiced
at hypothetical thinking and positing counterfactual alter-
natives as counterpoints to framing power.
Moral character, therefore, appears to have as much to
do with what you do when you have the power to frame an
action as you would like others to see it, as it does with the
common assertion that moral character is what you do
when no one else is watching. Framing affects the extent to
which others are watching. This, in turn, raises the ques-
tions of how are moral issues framed within the classroom
and what constitutes evidence of an ethical action. All
education is, in some sense, socialization. Take, for
example, voluntary product recalls, which are generally
interpreted as evidence of ethical behavior within the
business ethics classroom. Is this correct? Through a series
of counterfactual alternatives, Freeman and Gilbert (1988)
and Arce (2004) show that observing a firm voluntarily
recalling a product is not evidence that the firm is, in fact,
ethical or even socially concerned. Taking an action that
favors a certain segment of society (e.g., consumers) does
not imply that the segment in question is of primary con-
cern. On the contrary, in the examples provided by Free-
man and Gilbert (1988) and Arce (2004), the firm’s
primary concern when considering a ‘voluntary’ recall is
instead the reaction of the firm’s regulator. Context mat-
ters. As a tangible example, the same Johnson & Johnson
Company that is celebrated for conducting its 1982 public
recall of Tylenol also conducted a 2009 stealth recall of
Motrin by hiring contractors to buy the Motrin back at
points of sale as if they were customers. The fact that
deceptive practices such as a stealth recall or indirect
action can be used to manipulate ethical judgments implies
a responsibility to make frames explicit in classroom
10 Indeed, bailouts are never about getting taxpayers a good deal.
Bailouts of financial firms are based on the concept of systemic risk in
that when a highly interconnected firm fails, this may weaken other
financial firms. By contrast, in nonfinancial sectors, firms often benefit
from the failure of a competitor.
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teaching and to question and reflect on the frames
employed within the classroom. Students should be
encouraged to approach ethical questions from multiple
frames of reference and to consciously reflect on their
implications, particularly if they result in preference
reversals.
One can also think of framing power in terms of the way
in which an ethical problem is initially defined or the
background assumptions implicit in raising ethical aware-
ness are presented. For example, the AIG case examined
here is framed in terms of shareholder rights, consistent
with the primacy of shareholder interests in the U.S. ver-
sion of capitalism. This is another form of socialization that
occurs within business education. AIG shareholders lost
their equity as part of the AIG bailout, the amount lost was
deliberately punitive, and when representatives had their
day in court, a federal judge ruled that they had been
deprived of their legal rights and expectations, but no
damages were ultimately awarded to shareholders. By
contrast, Bernanke’s (2015, p. 261) framing of the bailout
is well-intentioned but legalistic, emphasizing the Fed’s
charter and the question of systemic risk. ‘‘Unlike Lehman
… AIG appeared to have sufficiently valuable assets … to
serve as collateral and to meet the legal requirement that
the loan be ‘secured to the satisfaction’ of the lending
Reserve Bank.’’ Continuing (p. 367), ‘‘Why had we not
insisted that those [AIG’s] counterparties, which included
companies like Goldman Sachs, bear some losses? … we
had no legal means to force reductions.’’ Yet, when the
totality of the Fed’s actions in the AIG intervention were
laid side-by-side, as is the case in joint evaluation, they
were judged to constitute a ‘‘backdoor bailout’’ of coun-
terparties (SIGTARP 2009) and an illegal exaction of
shareholder equity (Wheeler 2015).
In the end, we have confirmed Prentice’s (2004) concern
that a simple reframing of a moral issue can produce a
totally different ethical evaluation of the same action. In
our example, shareholder rights are violated via indirect
action without provoking moral outrage. By contrast, we
have shown that joint evaluation, counterfactual construc-
tion, and hypothetical reasoning provide a moral counter-
point to indirectly subverting shareholders’ rights. This is a
provocative observation as it should be of particular con-
cern to those that espouse a positive ‘‘values-free’’ version
of business education based on the primacy of shareholder
rights. In the AIG case, shareholder rights were found to
have been violated via a reframing of the issue and when an
AIG shareholder pointed this out through the legal system
there was widespread outrage arguing that the lawsuit was
tantamount to claiming that the bailout was insufficiently
generous. This change in narrative is another reframing of
the issue. From a pedagogical perspective, favoring out-
comes involving certain groups or segments of society over
others may actually encourage the use of deceptive prac-
tices, as was the case in the AIG intervention. Our exper-
iment and its associated results highlight the benefits of
business ethics education as providing the tools for seeing
through such framing effects.
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